Naughton for many sorts of assistance. We also benefited greatly from very helpful comments from three anonymous readers, and have responded to them as much as we could.
a not inconsiderable, but unknown, percentage of those who once filled those posts were rapidly thrown into sudden and intractable impoverishment. 4 Besides, along with the jobs went the end of the welfare benefits that had been attached to the posts, so the situation of these rejected persons was grim indeed.
The central government has made several attempts to address this externality; the results of this effort, however, have varied among localities in their application of the programs. This paper seeks to find regularity in this disparity of execution with respect to one of the new programs, the one billed as the final resort in assisting the laid-off, the other two being a Reemployment Project and unemployment insurance. 5 This third "line" of the three is a scheme of social assistance aimed at compensating particularly desperate municipal citizens. The target group is comprised of members of what the government calls the ruoshi qunti [弱势 群体] or vulnerable groups, a negative product of China's effective adoption of capitalism; its members are for the most part low-or un-skilled, chronically ill or disabled. 6 The program in question, called the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (zuidi shenghuo baozhang [最低 生活 保障] , colloquially,the dibao 低保]; its target population, the dibaohu [低保户] . It is administered at the municipal level and is provided only to permanent urban registrants within the given city. As with schemes of social assistance elsewhere, this is a form of social protection in which the benefit bestowed is means-tested, meager, stigmatizing, and offered as a last resort. 7 It supplies the poor with cash transfers and does not entail contributions, as its beneficiaries--who generally have no work nor any employer prepared to take responsibility for their fate--are totally unequipped to pay into it. 8 While the larger subject of social welfare has been much studied in the field of comparative politics, with only a few exceptions it has been analyzed as executed in democratic states. 9 Scholars who treat welfare as a function of democratic politics describe politicians' rationale in dispensing it as based on their all-embracing concern with the electoral imperative. But in nondemocracies, where elections are either empty charades or are nonexistent, this motivation for assistance on the part of politicians is, obviously, absent.
As opposed to the democratic welfare state paradigm, two older pieces of work on welfare and poor relief--Frances Fox Piven & Richard Cloward's book, Regulating the Poor and Claus Offe's paper, "Advanced Capitalism and the Welfare State" 10 -consider assistance in the context of changes in the economy, not as a correlate of activities within the polity.
That is, they pinpoint not voting but capitalism and its vicissitudes as the causal factor underlying the welfare relation between state rulers and the portion of the populace made needy by the forces of the market. Piven & Cloward see the two pivotal roles of poor relief in capitalist states (of whatever regime type) as maintaining civic order and regulating labor.
Though they do not specify the particular modalities, these authors note two governmental goals in officialdom's regulation of labor: The first is to "absorb and control enough of the unemployed to restore order".."when mass unemployment leads to outbreaks of turmoil" [or, in the case of China's dibao program, this could refer to an effort to prevent an outbreak of disorder at such a juncture]. The second objective concerns the time when the labor market expands again; at that point, relief is used, they claim-with the denigration and punitiveness it directs toward those "of no use as workers" (such as the aged, the disabled, and the insane)--as a disincentive to discourage people readmitted into the labor market from "relax[ing] into beggary and pauperism." 11 Both these studies understand the recipients of welfare as people who become obsolete, even worthless, when alterations in the nature of the demand for labor make their skills inadequate for a new phase of economic growth. The Piven & Cloward book links rises in the need for aid to times of foundational, historic dislocations in the economy, speaking of the "catastrophic changes" that appear in eras of rapid modernization, precisely like what China has been experiencing for 30 years. 12 Several features of the poor relief crafted by the provisioning pioneers that Piven & Cloward detail-demands for "good," "moral" behavior on the part of beneficiaries, along with surprise visits to their homes to confirm this; decisions to allocate only so much funding to families as to supplement their incomes up to a bare minimum livelihood; and a principle of "less eligibility," decreeing that a welfare subject's portion must be lower than that of the most poorly paid laborer 13 --are also hallmarks of China's current dibao, 14 as they often are in 11 Piven & Cloward, op. cit., 3, 408. 12 Ibid., [5] [6] [7] [15] [16] [17] 11, 22, 30, 35. 14 Dorothy J. Solinger, "The Urban Dibao: Guarantee for Minimum Livelihood or for Minimal Turmoil?" in Fulong Wu and Chris Webster, Marginalization in social assistance elsewhere. But as we will see, in some, but not all, Chinese cities, this scheme operates such that it limits the actions of the poor, frequently sidetracking indigent people out of the mainstream of urban citizenry and its economic activity (i.e., effectively working to regulate the labor market by keeping it free of undesirables). Indeed, this is a variable outcome: such results seem strongest where capitalism and cosmopolitan pretensions are most prominent, i.e., in the richer, but not in the poorer, cities. This distinction suggests a bifurcation of behaviors among Chinese urban officialdom that we explore below.
Another factor in the paradigm casting social assistance as a concomitant of capitalism is Offe's designation of welfare as a "safety valve," for guarding against "potential social problems." He points to a "benign neglect" informing welfare spending, which, he argues, is minimal, since such outlays target population segments whose appeals do not seem particularly worrisome to policy makers. 15 Thus, these writers suggest that not only electoral behavior but also capitalism (an economic, but regime-type-neutral, factor)--with its unpredictable and potentially merciless markets in labor-can be a core mechanism driving state beneficence. This analysis makes sense for China, where votes mean little to nothing, but where using hand-outs to induce popular passivity, and where removing the unskilled from the labor market-and thereby enhancing productivity--can mean a lot.
Urban China: Comparative Perspectives (Basingbroke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 253-77. 15 Offe, op. cit., 479, 485. Four features growing out of this line of reasoning-the use of relief subsidies to regulate the labor market (and, indirectly, enhance output); the concern with maintaining order, or , using Chinese catchwords, guaranteeing "social stability" and "harmony"; the targeting of anachronistic [or useless] workers-mostly the old, the under-educated, and the disabled or otherwise infirm--as the appropriate recipients; and the token expenditures 16 -cum-"benign neglect" that mark such programs-are all pertinent to our analysis.
Some of these features are most strongly exemplified in the wealthier Chinese cities most influenced by the dynamics of capitalism, others in poorer places, we will demonstrate. This paper offers one explanation for these distinctions.
Subnational disparity in policy implementation, we assume, is at least in part a function of cities' fiscal health, as market opening has gone hand-in-glove with decentralization, while localities have grossly disparate resource bases and revenue streams. 17 And our data show what appears to be systematic variation marking the ways in which local leaders in well and in poorly endowed cities, respectively, dole out state charity among three specific types of poverty recipients. We do not claim a relationship of cause and effect between the economic health of a city and its dibao allocational decisions, but we do uncover a October 27-30, 2008," 11. 17 Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The evolution of central-provincial fiscal relations in China, 1971 -1984 ," The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 25 (1991 , 1-32; and Christine P. Wong, "Rebuilding Government for the 21 st Century," CQ, No. 200 (2009), 929-952. provocative correlation. Our results are consistent with a deduction that prosperous metropolises' welfare choices act to hide away these places' indigent, while less well-financed towns are prone to encourage their poor openly to contribute to their own sustenance.
Besides fieldwork observations and some 80 interviews with dibaohu, urban dibao administrators, and community officials in six cities (Wuhan, Guangzhou, Lanzhou; and Jingzhou, Qianjiang, and Xiantao, Hubei) over four summers (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , we also used two datasets. Since the urban registered population living in the city district (shiqu [市区] ) are the only people eligible for this relief in the cities, we used data only on this population. Dibao recipient data come from an unusual dataset compiled by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, available online, that discloses how over 600 individual cities divide up their dibao funds among 10 categories of welfare recipients (categories include the aged, women, the registered unemployed, those performing "flexible labor" [linghuo jiuye灵活 就业] 18 , the working poor, students, the disabled); the table shows both the numbers of recipients in each category in each city and the total number of recipients of the dibao in each city, making it possible to calculate the percentages each category represents of the total recipients per city.
We consider three of these categories, each of which can be read to convey information about a city's stance toward people outside the mainstream economy: flexible workers, the disabled, and the registered unemployed. At the time our We first briefly sketch the program in question, highlighting in italics the four elements drawn from the Piven/Cloward/Offe interpretation noted above, which, we argue, fit the management of the scheme quite well. We then draw upon fieldwork that led to a set of three hypotheses, and lay out these hypotheses.
The methodology and results come next, followed by a discussion of our own and of alternative explanations, and our conclusions.
THE MINIMUM LIVELIHOOD GUARANTEE PROGRAM
Objectives and character of the scheme 19 The China Infobank comes from the National Bureau of Statistics Chinese City Statistical Yearbook 2008. 20 Thanks to Yumin Sheng for this insight.
As industrial restructuring progressed, it became clear that it was the anachronistic workers, as Piven & Cloward articulated would be the case, who became the brunt of the process. Thus, the coming of capitalism entailed a state-induced streamlining of the industrial economy in favor of the professionally and personally fit. 21 As protests by dismissed workers mounted, 22 the Chinese leadership agonized over the implications that current and potential disorder could have for the state's hallowed objectives of "social stability," inter-group "harmony" and for a successful project of state enterprise reform-cum-economic modernization. In 1999, after a half dozen years of grass-roots experimentation with locallydesigned efforts at social assistance, and in the realization that earlier efforts to compensate laid-off workers, such as the Reemployment Project, The paucity of the final outlay of funds was obvious from the start.
In the first 10 months of 1999, just 1.5 billion yuan was extended to the target population, at that time a mere 2.8 million individuals. Table Two 
The design of the program: setting the urban poverty line
Though there are often reports of China's poverty line, this applies only to the rural areas. There is no national urban poverty line in China.
The dibao norm or standard [biaozhun, 标准], a municipally-designated version of this line, varies across cities. The mission of the dibao is to subsidize households whose average per capita income falls below the amount necessary for purchasing basic necessities at the prices prevailing in a given place. Letting localities peg their own lines was done because the average per capita income varies regionally; another consideration, initially, was that each city was to supply a large portion of the outlay. 29 Later, the central government recognized that the poorest cities were unable to afford the requisite amounts and subsidized these places. 30 By 2003 the proportion of subsidies from the center varied from as low as 16 percent in Fujian along the wealthy East coast to more than 70 percent in the destitute Western provinces of Gansu and Guizhou. While some cities were contributing next to nothing, the seven wealthiest metropolises and provinces have been charged with financing the program entirely by 29 Wang Hui,"Chengshi zuidi shenghuo baozhang gongzuo zhi wo jian" [My opinion on the urban minimum livelihood guarantee work], ZGMZ, 10 (1996) , 34 explains that, the line was to be set by adopting the "vegetable basket method," according to which each city selects certain livelihood necessities, determines their minimum requisite consumption amount, and calculates the income necessary to purchase these goods, based on the price index in the area. 30 Christine Wong, "Central-local relations in an era of fiscal decline," CQ, No. 128 (1991) The local dibao line was to be fixed below the minimum wage in each city, as it normally is where social assistance is provided (just as was dictated by the old principle of "less eligibility" mentioned above), and also lower than the amount dispensed in unemployment insurance benefits, supposedly-again, as elsewhere in the world--in order to encourage employment. In truth, however, in many, but not all, cities, local policy states that acquisition of even a tiny increment in income through occasional labor can result in a drastic reduction in the household's dibao disbursement, effectively discouraging recipients from engaging in informal labor. 33
FIELDWORK OBSERVATIONS: THE BASIS FOR THE HYPOTHESES
Visits to two very different cities in 2007 initially brought to the attention of one of the authors the variability with which different urban financial endowments appeared to color the approach of local officials to the very poor.
One of these cities, Wuhan, the vibrant capital of Hubei province in central China and relatively well-off, aspires to cosmopolitanism; the other, Lanzhou, the 31 Leung, "The Emergence," 193; idem., "The Development,´7; Tang, "The New Situation," published in 2002, states that, "With the exception of Beijing, Shanghai, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong, all the other provinces got the central government's financial subsidies [for the dibao]. 32 Qianjiang got 99 percent of its dibao funds from the central government, and Xiantao got 98 percent of theirs (interviews, July 6 and July 8, respectively). 33 Several of Solinger's informants revealed this. capital city of northwestern Gansu province, situated in a barren and rocky part of the country in one of China's most poverty-stricken provinces, is far less geared to appearing modern. Inspection of these two cities suggested the possibility that systematic variation in welfare governance might mark wealthier and more indigent cities, respectively.
The respective statistical data for these two locales convey the story Society has to go forward, we need money to create a civilized environment, sanitation to develop a good environment, a clean shopping area, basic construction facilities necessary to build a better livelihood for people in the future. All cities have pedestrian malls or are building them. They can give Wuhan more competitive ability, for business and tourism. People will come here. We've also built a beach along Yanjiang Road and it did attract tourists here during the National Day vacation. 37 Further evidence of this proclivity for pristine roadways and for attracting foreigners were the actions of the politician Yu Zhengsheng, Where this bias exists, in municipalities bent on becoming showcases to the outside world, it seems to operate to marginalize and exclude "anachronistic" individuals, whose abilities and qualifications would prevent them from performing the complex tasks called for in a state-of-the-art economy, as we will argue. 
HYPOTHESES
The contrasts between Wuhan and Lanzhou resonated with Piven/Cloward/Offe's description of social welfare as being about the management of anachronistic workers; regulation of the labor market; and maintenance of order, especially by means of fostering clear streets, all of which appeared to vary in two cities having quite differing levels of resources. We wish to uncover the extent to which this variation holds across a larger number of cities. Given that cities are charged with setting their own poverty lines, that their level of resources varies substantially, and that wealthier and upwardly mobile cities-having the capacity to do so-are, we reason, more apt to be oriented toward presenting their cities to outsiders as modern spectacles, we drew on our fieldwork to hypothesize that: H1: The wealthier the city, the more inclined its officials will be to use their dibao funds for disabled people, i.e., to have such persons as a relatively high percentage of their total dibao recipients. This they do in the hope of maintaining an unsullied urban scene by giving these people stipends and so keeping them off the streets.
Using the terminology of Piven/Cloward/Offe, disabled people are what city officials in wealthier cities would consider anachronistic workers, both publicly unsightly and unable to be placed within a modernizing economy. Indeed, while wealthier places shut down moneylosing, special factories for the disabled in the late 1990s, officials in smaller, less prosperous towns related that the chengguan there was lenient and that its officials refrained from chasing such people from the avenues. 43 H2: The richer the city, the more prone its decisionmakers will be to extend the dibao to registered unemployed workers.
This relationship could occur because wealthier cities have more sophisticated, technologically-oriented economies. 44 Thus, registered unemployed workers are very likely to be people lacking the skills and educational background necessary for participating in the new capital-and knowledge-intensive industries of 21 st -century, modern China. Receipt of the dibao could encourage them not to look for work in the formal economy, where, indeed, they are not apt to find employment in any case. 43 Interviews with local officials, Qianjiang, Hubei, July 6, 2010 and Xiantao, Hubei, July 8, 2010. 44 Fulong Wu and Ningying Huang, "New urban poverty in China," Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 48, 2 (2007), pp. 168, 175-76 note that firms in industrial sectors that were not competitive internationally were compelled to downsize.
Thus, a wealthier city could be enticing laid-off laborers to leave--and not attempt to re-enter--the labor market, by offering them the dibao funds they need to maintain their minimum livelihood.
Poorer cities' economies, on the other hand, being less advanced, are also more able to absorb the unskilled registered unemployed. Consequently, we expect to find a correlation between the poverty of a city and a lower percentage of registered unemployed obtaining the dibao among the program's total dibao beneficiaries in that city. Again, the range for the percent of registered unemployed recipients among our sample cities is wide, averaging 19 percent of all recipients across cities, but going as high as 40 percent in Wuhan and Qingdao, both well-off, modernized cities, but in the single digits in smaller, poorer cities. 47 Leung, "op. cit.," p. 11, states that: "The formulation of the assistance standard by local governments has been largely affected by their financial capacity and development priority, rather than solely based on objective expenditure surveys of low-income people." unpleasant to boot, and which also promises a less reliable payment than does the dibao. 48 Flexible laborers, on average across the sample cities, constitute 16 percent of total recipients, but the percentage goes as low as 1.7 percent in Shanghai and as high as 33 percent in the far smaller and poorer Western city of Guyuan.
These hypotheses amount to correlations, and are grounded in the notion that treatment of the poor is fundamentally different, and follows distinctly dissimilar logics, in cities at varying levels of wealth. At base, the hypotheses pit the urge to present a cosmopolitan perspective in prosperous municipalities against a focus upon saving revenue in poorer cities.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Data
We used the China Infobank data for the average wage in the cities in our sample, which we took as a proxy for the wealth of a given city. We chose this proxy rather than GDP per capita, a figure often resorted to in economic research comparing Chinese cities, because it is not comparable among cities. Even though average wage is not a perfect measure of a city's wealth or resources, we believe it is a reasonable indicator. For clearly a city housing firms that can afford to pay higher wages must also be a place with higher tax income and thus more revenue. Many Chinese "cities" now contain large stretches of rural areas and rural-registered population. Given wide rural-urban disparities in income, this renders many city per capita indicators not reflective of the true city situation. The value of such indicators, instead, is simply a function of the proportion of the "ruralness" in any given city's "urban" districts. 49 Besides, most cities report their total GDP, (that of the "whole city" (quanshi [全市] ), which definitely includes many rural residents who are not counted as part of the "city's" population. But then they count only the urbanregistered as members of their populations, neglecting rural migrants who have may have resided in the city over long periods of time but who lack urban registration, and whose numbers in some cases amount to as much as a third of the city's formal, official urban population. Such variable counting practices skew the results differentially in different municipalities.
Our statistical data covers 63 cities. Of these, 36 are "super-large" cities, and include all 31 provincial capitals and several other cities having populations above two million. These 36 cities are those typically used in research on the urban dibao. 50 We randomly selected an additional 24 municipalities, all prefectural-level cities belonging to a set called "large" cities. 51 We chose these 24 cities by randomly selecting from each province one such city for which the requisite data were available, and which also had populations between half a million and a million people as of 2007. 52 We added these "large" cities to investigate the variation that size might introduce, especially given that all prior dibao research has been carried out only on the super-large cities, to the best of our knowledge. "Large" cities are especially important to study in work on the dibao program, since 85 percent of the scheme's targets live in these cities or in even smaller ones. 53 Variables Table Three lists all variables and their descriptions. Besides average wage, three other variables match the three hypotheses above: disabled workers as a percent of total dibao recipients; registered unemployed workers as a percent of total dibao workers; and flexible laborers as a percent of total dibao recipients. Dibao expenditure as a percentage of city GDP is included to control for a city government's generosity; it strongly and significantly correlates negatively with average wage. This finding suggests either that poorer cities have more poor people and therefore are compelled to spend more on the dibao or that poor cities get a large injection of funds from the central government for their dibao payments. Most likely, both are true.
Methodology
Ordinary Least Square regression is used to show the variable correlations between average wage and the three other variables. One model is used for each of the variables in our three hypotheses: Model 1 is for the variable number of flexible workers who are dibao recipients as a percentage of total dibao recipients in a city; model 2 is for the variable number of registered unemployed dibao recipients as a percentage of total dibao recipients in a city; and model 3 is for the variable number of disabled dibao recipients in a city as a percent of total recipients.
In models 4 and 5, the percentage of flexible labor dibao recipients is regressed on government revenue in two groups: Model 4 uses as its group cities with lower than median government revenue. Model 5 analyses the group of cities with higher than median government revenue. We split cities into two groups because poorer cities receive much of their dibao funding as an earmarked allocation from the central government, while richer cities pay for the dibao either entirely or mostly from their municipal revenues. The different sources of funding may cause cities to have different giving patterns. It should be noted here that, despite poorer cities receiving most or all of their funding from upper levels of government, all urban officials interviewed uniformly claimed that there were no quotas or targets dictating limits to the numbers of needy people that could be subsidized, and neither were there specific reporting obligations to their superiors. It did appear in interviews that each city made its own decisions about whom to fund. 54 
Results
We regresses flexible laborers as a percentage of total dibao recipients on average wage, after data are put into two groups according to the median amount of government revenue in a city. The regression shows that in low-average wage Hypothesis 1 is buttressed by Model 3 in Table 7 : the wealthier the city the more likely that a larger percentage of the city's dibao recipients are disabled people-in our reasoning, to keep them off the streets. Hypothesis 2 is consistent with Model 2 in Table 7 : the richer the city, the more prone its decisionmakers are to extend the dibao to registered unemployed workers, since, 54 It is possible that allocations made by city districts would vary as do those made by cities themselves, but we refrained from testing that relation in this paper.
in our interpretation, these workers cannot easily be placed in the city's formal economy.
Governments whose dibao spending is a higher percentage of GDP (that is, poorer cities) are more likely to give dibao funding to flexible laborers (Model 1), and to the registered unemployed (model 2). We believe this may indicate that these cities do not want to inhibit informal labor, and so do not provide a disincentive against working on the streets by withdrawing the dibao (or a large proportion of it) when a person is doing irregular labor. There is no confirmation of the hypothesis that these governments are less likely to give money to the disabled. Model 3, however, does show that the Western region, the poorest in the country, 55 is generally less likely to give the dibao to the disabled than are other regions (especially the northeast and the central regions).
DISCUSSION OF THE DATA; ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
The statistical findings provide suggestive correlations between level of wealth/poverty in a city, on one side, and cities' variable treatment of three categories of welfare recipients, on the other. Returning to Piven & Cloward and Offe, we find that several of the features of social assistance they identify can be seen as characterizing the operation of the dibao 55 According to World Bank, op. cit., p. 73, 6 .8 percent of the urban people living in the northwest region of the country are poor to the extent of twice the Bank's poverty level, and in the southwest the rate is 6.6 percent. The rates are 4.4 percent in the coast, 6.3 percent in the northeast, and 6.2 percent in central China. We consider the "West" as: Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Tibet, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Chongqing, nearly matching the Bank's southwest and northwest regions. 
Alternative Explanations
It is possible that the total numbers of each dibao recipient category in each city's population might affect the percentage each category represents among total dibao recipients in that city. Unfortunately, we were unable to locate data indicating the numbers that these categories of poor people represent in the general population for our entire sample of 63 cities. For instance, for numbers of disabled in the cities, there are certainly no data that we know of. It could be that poorer cities, presumably having more problems of untreated environmental pollution, would have more disabled people. But it could also be that wealthier cities, where manufacturing has been rapid and extensive, could have more industrial accidents, or, also more pollution. Without any way to collect the necessary data, we are forced to posit a random distribution of these population categories, even though the truth may be otherwise.
It is also possible that there is simply more "flexible labor" in poorer cities, for whatever reason. But if that is the case, that would be consistent with our explanation, because it would mean that such municipalities permit and encourage this type of work. Even if that were true, however, this would still distinguish between cities with more and less wealth and would help to explain why flexible workers constitute a larger proportion of the dibao recipients in poor than in rich cities.
Finally, it could be that there are simply more registered unemployed people in rich than in poor cities. That is, these peoples' numbers could be higher in wealthier places simply because there are more still-extant firms in these richer cities who had been able to pay into the unemployment insurance fund for their dismissed workers while they were still employed (such payments are a necessary condition for anyone to receive unemployment insurance, and so to register as unemployed). Nonetheless, giving the dibao to these people would just the same represent a choice by city governments to placate/pacify these people (i.e., to preserve order), and would also serve as an acknowledgment that there are no spots for them in the regular economy.
CONCLUSIONS
Our findings suggest that in China, where profits, modernization, and foreign investment have become significant to leaders at all levels, there may be a logic undergirding welfare allocation that grows out of an economic, not a political calculus. Our work seems to demonstrate that, where lower echelons of administration have authority to make rules about welfare rationing, urban finances appear to correlate with such allocational decisions. This seems to be the case in poor places, where officials attempt to save on funds; it also seems so in wealthier municipalities, where it is well known and easily observable that authorities design their urban areas as showcases, in the hope of attracting outside tourism and foreign investment.
For in well-off cities a relatively lower percentage of all dibao recipients are people known to be engaged in "flexible labor" as compared with in poorer cities. Preferring clearer sidewalks, welfare distributors in such cities deduct dibao funds from impoverished people who try to make their own money, we argue, in the interest of keeping such people out of the public eye and safely at home. At the same time, relatively higher proportion of people with disabilities, and also comparatively more people who are registered as unemployed, receive assistance in wealthier than in poorer municipalities. The explanation we offer is that officials in the richer cities are more likely to want those they view as unsightly or as incompetent workers to stay out of view and away from the regular labor market. Consequently, our story goes, authorities offer these people official sustenance by means of the dibao. We cannot prove these connections definitively. But at the very least, our findings do, in fact, fit remarks made by welfare officials in two cities, one wealthier and one poorer.
We suggest that these findings-whether or not they represent causal connections, and regardless of whether they result from conscious intentionality on the part of city officialdom--are in accord with the known preferences of urban administrators in wealthier locales for achieving a modern appearance in their cities and for fostering technological sophistication in their economies.
And it could certainly be that, in the views of the administrators of such cities, to become effectively modern and sufficiently attractive to foreign investors and tourists, the city must keep disciplined, out of the work force, and even out of sight both the new underdogs to which marketization has given birth, and also people with a visible infirmity. These people, thus, are encouraged to stay at home by being offered the dibao according to our reasoning.
In poorer places, on the other hand, where funds are scarcer and where pretensions to grandeur weaker, our three categories of recipients are treated in the opposite way from how they are handled in well-off sites. Both the disabled and flexible workers are allowed on the streets without their dibao allocation being diminished, as their fending for themselves is viewed as saving funds for the city budget. And administrators seem not to worry about an embarrassing urban appearance, for outside visitors are relatively rare and foreign investment unlikely in any event. Thus, a smaller percentage of all recipients are disabled people in these environments. And a relatively higher percentage of beneficiaries are informal workers, as compared with in the wealthier cities, because, we propose, officials in poor places prefer to conserve their city's dibao funds for other uses, and do not object to the sight of people earning money informally on the city's roads.
The registered unemployed, on the other hand, represent a lower proportion of the dibao beneficiaries in less well-off municipalities than they do in the wealthier locales. This could be the case because the economies in such places--less advanced and less technologically driven, and also less foreigninvested--are more likely to have spots for them, even as local officials are less disposed than are the ones in rich cities to keep these people at home and out of work. The upshot is that laid-off workers are considered suitable for regular employment and so are less apt to constitute a large proportion of the dibao recipients in cities that are more strapped for funds.
In sum, our research suggests that an influential formulation stating that welfare giving is geared toward catering to voters is purely regime-specific. In an authoritarian regime undergoing capitalist-style development, modernization and globalization, we submit, the logics of governance and of social policy are likely to be driven by quite a different line of reasoning, one in line with writings from 40 years ago that instead emphasizes an economic rationale for poor relief. 
